JOURNAL
ISSUE 6
2002/2003
Dean, Professor, Dr. sc. Vlado Puljiz
THE
WELFARE STATE AND DECENTRALISATION
Abstract: The welfare state today is passing through
a serious financial and conceptual crisis whose roots lie
in economic, technological and demographic changes. Decentralisation
is one of the ways of resolving this crisis - instead of
the central government inefficiently trying to resolve the
problems that have accumulated, some of the tasks might
be carried out by lower territorial units according to the
principle of subsidiarity. Successful decentralisation of
social policy requires the creation of conditions for activating
civil society institutions. Although the social policy and
social assistance in Croatia should be decentralised, this
process is hampered by poverty within society in general
and by significant differences among regions in terms of
economic developmen.
THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CURRENT CRISIS
(1) Criticism of the concept of the welfare state, in the
form that dominated after the Second World War, is coming
both from the right and left of the political spectrum.
Neo-liberal critics, such as Hayek, Nozick and Friedmann,
support what is known as “the new rights”, which
imply reduced state interference. On the other hand, the
left-wing theoretician, J. Habermas, points out that the
mechanisms of the welfare state have colonised society and
“consumed” a significant part of citizens’ personal freedoms (Abrahamson, 1990).
Moreover, there are complaints that in the secondary distribution
of revenue which is carried out by the welfare state, people
from the lower social layers who need most help are those
who come off worst. This is known as the St Mathew’s
Effect, which states that whoever possesses will receive
and have even more. In other words, if social groups compete
for welfare benefits, usually those who win in the market’s
primary distribution will also receive more in the secondary
distribution carried out by the state. Namely, the conditions
and procedures of the social security systems are, as a
rule, adapted to the middle class which, when realising
its social rights, uses networks of influence and power
to which the socially disadvantaged groups of the population
have no access (Deleeck, 1978.). The problem of moral hazard
is also apparent in the behaviour of the users of the social
security system. Namely, many of them are not careful to
avoid the risk against which they are insured, because they
know that they will be compensated for their loss and because
they assume that other users are not careful either. This
is the typical behaviour of those who use common goods (the
curse of the collective). As in the theory of games, people
do not behave exclusively according to their own criteria,
but also according to the actions they expect from others.
This can easily be confirmed by general behaviour, when
insurance against risk exists which lowers the responsibility
of the individual in spending communal funds. The welfare
state thus becomes a huge insurance and idemnification machine
(Evald, 1985).
The most serious critical remarks on the welfare state warn
us that it encourages the dissolution of the primary forms
of solidarity (family, neighbourhood, local community) and
thus takes upon itself the impossible task of resolving
an increasing number of social problems which appear in
society. It has been pointed out that in developed countries,
particularly in those that have a strong liberal orientation,
the development of mass society and Ford’s production
structure was accompanied by social atomisation, that is,
a weakening of primary social groups in which people used
to satisfy their basic needs. In these circumstances, lonely
individuals (as part of D. Riesmann’s “lonely
mass”) mainly satisfy their needs on the market, and
when they often do not succeed, they turn to the state.
The whole wealth-distribution system gradually acquires
bipolar characteristics (market-state) which means that
the space for intermediary forms of sociability and mutual
support grows smaller: “The crisis of the welfare
state is, in large measure, an exponential expression of
this rigidity. The forms of state solidarity, the development
of services and collective institutions cannot compensate
for the consequences of the atomisation of society. Hypersocialisation
coming from above can no longer respond to the induced desocialisation
at the core of society … After all, if “social”
does not mean anything but a network of autonomous, separate
individuals, the state will have to cover them in full.
It will become the only possible form of social solidarity,
and the only manner of expressing collective life …
In this way, the welfare state is partly associated with
the growth of individualism: the less the individual relies
on his or her close ones, the more he or she has to turn
to the state as a powerful protector” (Rosanvallon,
1981: 115-116).
This is, therefore, a radical criticism of the welfare state
which, by taking over the role of the main “producer
of social welfare” after the market had rejected the
previous forms of solidarity, has found itself in the impossible
position of tutor of society and the only guarantor of social
cohesion. The welfare state appears as a Leviathan which
gobbles up the societal creations of the lower levels within
which people used to live in mutuality and solidarity. The
huge administrative apparatus which has been created by
the welfare state is the outer expression of its growth,
bureaucratic inefficacy and insensitivity. There are also
opinions that the crisis of the welfare state is less and
less associated with economic factors and that in the largest
measure it is the expression of the impossibility of the
task for the state to satisfy the social needs of a society
which is undergoing complete transformation. The welfare
state, it is said, is not capable of responding to the challenge
of the exclusion of a large number of people from society,
i.e. responding to the need for their social integration
(Calvaruso, 1994).
(2) The main causes
of the crisis of the welfare state in western countries can
also be applied to European post-socialist countries. These
countries have also undergone extensive demographic changes
which have not differed significantly from those in the West.
Moreover, the welfare state has had a negative impact on the
economic sphere. Social policy was identified with economic
policy and was marked by strong state paternalism. The governing
nomenklatura distributed social status, mostly following the
criterion of loyalty. The state employed people, retired them,
distributed flats, social benefits and services. The social
transfer system was not transparent; in fact, the relationship
between the providers and the beneficiaries was completely
blurred. This enabled the state to rise above society and
to have overall control over its citizens. There was, nevertheless,
a silent agreement between the elite in power and the wide
layers of the population, which gave power to the elite who
in turn guaranteed social security to the population. Therefore,
individual freedom was sacrificed for the security and the
realisation of an abstract ideological project.
In socialism, contrary to T. H. Marshall’s model, social
rights developed before civil and political rights. In its
first phase of development, socialism carried out the modernisation
of backward societies in Eastern Europe with relative success,
but did not succeed in sustaining economic growth during the
second phase of its development, when the very civil and political
freedoms, private property, individual initiatives and private
entrepreneurship became a necessary precondition of advancement.
Failure on the political plane caused a fall in the standards
of living of the population and threatened the basic achievement
of socialism – social security. Since the ruling elite
did not succeed in ensuring accumulation and economic growth,
it lost its legitimacy to govern society on the social plane.
“In other words, the contract between the ruling nomenklatura
on the one hand, and the wide layers of the impoverished population
on the other side, practically ceased to exist, and, as a
consequence, socialism as the ruling system simply caved in
upon itself” (Puljiz, 1996).
After the failure of socialism, post-socialist countries had
to undergo a painful social experience. A marked regression
of economic activity was felt, as well as a fall in the standard
of living and a disintegration of the system of social security.
Many citizens of the former socialist countries had lived
in the illusion that western individual freedoms, standards
of living and social security would be achieved relatively
quickly by the very act of transforming the political system.
However, the transition turned out to be a long and arduous
process involving radical changes in the political, economic
and societal spheres, which this could not be achieved overnight.
Therefore, the failure of socialism led to a “new insecurity”
(Deacon, 1992). It is a fact that most former socialist countries,
which practically had not known what unemployment was, were
suddenly faced with mass unemployment after the fall of socialism
in 1989. A similar thing happened with poverty, which was
regarded as an exclusive phenomenon of the capitalist period.
Various socialist-protection measures, which the post-socialist
countries had undertaken at early stages in order to maintain
social security, had a weak effect, because the “anchors
of social security had slipped away, and the safety nets of
social security had been torn” (Standing, 1998). Nevertheless,
it must be emphasised that there was no expressed longing
to return to the old system, at least not in post-socialist
Central European countries. These countries have gradually,
with a great deal of effort and sacrifice, been pulling themselves
out of the crisis, seeking a new model of social security,
taking into account western experiences and development projections.
II. DECENTRALISATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
(1) How should the welfare state be further developed, in
what way should social problems be resolved, and how can the
essential levels of solidarity and social justice be maintained
in a society exposed to dynamic changes? With regard to this,
many ideas have appeared and various solutions have been applied
which are gradually being condensed into a new experience.
To simplify, the future of the welfare state comes down to
statism on the one hand, and privatisation on the other. Between
these two extremes, is a third possibility, which, to a large
degree, would be marked by decentralisation.
Social statism basically means the solution of social problems
within a bipolar (market-state) structure of the distribution
of wealth. However, the problem lies in the fact that the
increasing atomisation of society imposes the need for a meaning
to be found in the growing state redistribution of social
wealth. There is a danger that new taxes and contributions,
in other words, rising welfare costs, would lead to a kind
of block on society. This brings us to the negative consequences
of statism, such as the grey economy, illegal employment,
unacceptable inequalities, etc. Therefore, it can be said
that social statism as an alternative has actually worn itself
out and has been rejected by the social democrats who themselves,
were once its greatest supporters.
Privatisation, as the mainstay of the liberal scenario, supports
the dominant role of the market and the significantly reduced
role of the state in the redistribution of national wealth.
Its negative consequence is social regression, an increasing
suppression of the lower social strata and the spread of social
pathology. Instead of a welfare state, there is a need to
strengthen the repressive apparatus necessary for controlling
an increasing number of antisocial elements (for example,
as in the USA). Consequently, there is a danger that the state
gradually loses its legitimacy, particularly in the marginal,
impoverished parts of society that develop a kind of subculture,
which, as a rule, is contrary to central social values.
(2) What is left
is a “middle way” which helps to leave behind
the dichotomy of privatisation-statism which can be reduced
to the formula, collective services = state = non-market =
equality, or as an alternative, private services = market
= profit = inequality. The prevailing opinion is that the
future of the welfare state should be sought in the skilful
combination of different market and non-market elements. Rosanvallon
writes: “The unambiguous logic of statism should be
substituted by a triple dynamics which implies socialisation,
decentralisation and the process of increasing autonomy”
(Rosanvallon, 1981: 111). Socialisation is another term for
debureaucratisation, i.e. for the more rational management
of large social services and collective actions. Decentralisation
is expected to bring about such a reorganisation of public
services such that it would enable them to become closer and
more accessible to the users. The process of increasing autonomy
implies that local groups take over more tasks and responsibilities
in the social and cultural sectors. The process of increasing
autonomy also means the transfer of competence in the area
of welfare services from the state to non-governmental bodies.
In this way, the reduction of the welfare state opens opportunities
for a kind of production of sociability at lower levels. “What
has to be done is to develop a deeper civil society and a
space for exchange and solidarity which can be placed within
its frame, which means giving up both de-territorialisation
and the projection of the distribution of wealth to only two
polarities: the market and the state” (Rosanvallon,
1981: 115). In other words, the diminishing of social intervention
from the state, which will not end in social regression, should
enable the stimulation of the development of collective services
which will be supported by the citizens themselves, that is,
public services which will emerge from local initiatives.
This means that what is called a “welfare mix”
should be developed, in which the state will have a lesser
role, and in social actions there would be more space for
various social groups and organisations.
In the discussion on decentralisation it must be taken into
account that the traditional welfare state used to rely on
a kind of geographical indifference. The supporters of decentralisation
and the welfare mix insist that the social situation of an
individual or group cannot be understood independently of
their position in the local social context. For example, an
equal quantity of funds does not mean the same in a village,
where the family has a small vegetable garden, an orchard
or some cattle, and in the city, where everything must be
bought and there is no auto-consumer economy. Therefore, the
widening of civil society and the “localisation of welfare”
are becoming necessary components of the new social action
in society. Castel writes: “In such a conjunction, the
administrative forms of local welfare are deeply transformed
and the return to the localised contract and treatment is
to a large degree restored. This is not accidental. Contractualisation
reflects, and at the same time stimulates, a re-composition
of social exchange in an increasingly individualised manner.
Parallel to this, the localisation of social intervention
rediscovers the relationship of closeness between directly
interested partners, which the universalist legal regulation
had erased” (Castel, 1995: 762).
Decentralisation and the process of increasing autonomy enable
the establishment of an intermediary level between the individual
and the state. This is a kind of re-territorialisation of
social action, which makes space for the operation of informal,
small neighbouring groups; groups focused on a single interest,
self-help groups, activities of group advocacy, and formal
organisations which have social, cultural and other goals
at a local, regional, but also at a national level. This further
implies the renovation of the volunteer sector. Small local
groups can be particularly useful in providing everyday help
to people and in self-help actions. In the conclusion of the
study on social problems and the manners of resolving them
in European countries, M. Pijl writes that one has “the
impression of a deep currents of local energy and all to often
not finding them” (Pijl, 1994: 93).
Nevertheless, we must not fall under the illusion that the
decentralisation and localisation of social policy will bring
about only positive effects. There is a prominent fear that
decentralisation, apart from strengthening local collectives,
ensuring an ecological balance and satisfying a variety of
human needs, can lead to regional inequalities, conflicts
and intolerance. Therefore, if the welfare state with large
social security systems has made social transfers non-transparent
and individuals and social groups passive, radical localisation,
without the compensation of solidarity and justice at the
level of society as a whole, can lead to new problems. For
this reason, the process of decentralisation should be carried
out in parallel to the establishment of a mechanism to overcome
various conflicts. “The democratic ideal does not mean
denying or erasing conflicts under the unconvincing mask of
“consensus”, but making them productive and constructive.
The growth of social transparency and the development of democracy
go side by side in the same direction” (Rosanvallon,
1981: 127).
(3) When dealing
with decentralisation, discussion of the principle of subsidiarity
gains a special meaning. This principle demands that political
and other decisions are not made at any level that is higher
than necessary. “More precisely, that there should be
a decentralised organisation of responsibilites, with the
aim of never entrusting to a larger unit what can better be
realised by a smaller one” (Spicker, 1991: 3-4).
The subsidiarity principle is an old concept which was most
extensively promoted by the Catholic church. Though its origins
go back to the 19th century, the enclitic “Quadragesimo
Anno” by Pope Pius XI of 1931 is usually quoted as its
original formulation, stating: ”… just as it is
wrong to withdraw from the individual and to commit to the
community at large what private enterprise or endeavour can
accomplish, so it is likewise unjust and a gravely harmful
disturbance of the right order to hand over to a greater society
or higher rank functions and services which can be performed
by lesser bodies on a lower plane. For a social undertaking
of any sort, by its very nature, ought to aid the members
of the body social, but never to destroy and absorb them (Spicker,
1991: 14).
The subsidiarity principle could be interpreted in such a
way that state intervention is unnecessary as long as something
is possible at a lower social level in an alternative form.
This affirms in practice the principle of decentralisation.
However, subsidiarity can be observed as a defence of individual
freedom and independence. In fact, subsidiarity stems out
of an organic understanding of society: “Man is born
in society, into a family, and a nation, and by the mere fact
of existence, assumes inescapable duties towards his fellows
and is endowed with the rights of membership of that society”
(Clarke, 1975: 66). Subsidiarity implies hierarchical solidarity,
which means that “… the primary source of solidarity
or mutual responsibility is the family, then, secondarily,
the community, and so forth; only at a distance comes the
responsibility of the state, the international community and
“humankind” (Spicker, 1991: 5-6). After all, care
for people with special needs, like the ill, the old, the
handicapped, is carried out in the greatest measure by the
family, and the state has only a marginal role in this. Help
from the state is, in most cases, efficient if it has the
support and the co-operation of primary social groups, because
their activity is the precondition for the success of state
action.
Some authors point out that the subsidiarity principle is,
in most cases, understood only in its first, negative meaning,
which means that, according to circumstances, the intervention
of higher levels of society is prevented by lower levels.
However, the full interpretation of this principle implies
the obligation of the higher authority to assist individual
members of the social community: “In other words, subsidiarity
refers not only to the idea of intervention - at second hand
- i.e. acton to supplement (and arising from) incapacities
an failings by the lower groups, and only in proportion to
such incapacities and failings - but also to the idea of necessary
support of protection, which means supplementary action when
as soon as the need for it makes itself felt, and in particular
as soon as human -dignity - is deemed to be insufficiently
secure” (Ranjault, 1992: 49).
It is this very support and protection that constitutes the
foundation of the higher authority, from which stems its obligations
towards vulnerable groups or individuals who cannot provide
adequately for themselves and live a dignified life. In this
manner, the contradiction between the principles of subsidiarity
and solidarity can be resolved. In other words, subsidiarity
assumes that there is an organised society which is made up
of concentric, hierarchically arranged social groups. In such
a society, a dynamic balance must be achieved between freedom
and authority, and between autonomy and justice.
The supporters of various political orientations, on the left
and on the right, invoke the principle of subsidiarity, by
selecting from it what suits them best. Conservatives usually
try to apply subsidiarity to family policy, to the volunteer
sector and to the communal resolution of problems. At the
same time, they support strong centralised authority, and
refuse to accept decentralisation and the transfer of authority
to local bodies. Liberals prefer to defend individual autonomy
and entrepreneurship, whereas the members of the left see
decentralisation as the particular value of subsidiarity,
that is, the strengthening of local authorities. When we deal
with the new concept of the “third way”, the social
democrats and the centre left parties lean towards the widening
of various forms of civil society, and decentralisation serves
them as a suitable means to realise this end. Consequently,
the subsidiarity principle should not be understood as immanently
conservative. It can be invoked not only by those who are
threatened by statism, but also by those who are weaker in
relation to those who are more powerful (for example, regions
in relation to the state).
It is important, however, not to view the subsidiarity principle
as an isolated element, but within the context of other principles
like solidarity, equality and justice. Only in this way can
a dynamic balance be established, which is necessary for the
sustainability and development of society. Accordingly, subsidiarity
is compatible with a pluralism of societal values. The application
of the subsidiarity principle is very complex: “Above
all, there are hardly any absolute criteria which would allow
incontestable decisions to be reached concerning the incapaties
or failings of individuals and groups, and which would guarantee
the efficacy of supplementary intervention by the higher authority”
(Ranjault, 1992: 40). Practical policies in applying the subsidiarity
principle are the result of tradition on the one hand, and
of the relationship of political and social powers on the
other hand. Therefore, there is no ideal model for the application
of subsidiarity, but there is a search for solutions in concrete
situations which depends on a constellation of different social
and political powers.
The subsidiarity principle is currently very popular. Three
great events have contributed to its topicality. In the first
place, European integration, both economic, and socio-political.
It is known that within the European Union the subsidiarity
principle is applied in the relationships between the Union
itself and the member states, but also within the individual
member states in relation to the regions and smaller territorial
units. Furthermore, the fall of socialism has also contributed
to the resurrection of subsidiarity. Socialism denied this
principle by stigmatising it as a product of Western conservatism.
Socialism relied on the Jacobine political tradition, which
was extremely intolerant of autonomous, intermediary instances
between the individual and society. Finally, the value of
subsidiarity has also increased due to the mentioned crisis
of the Western welfare state.
Today, a “subsidiary state”, i.e. a state which
has transferred part of its obligations to lower levels and
other protagonists in society, is more appreciated than the
traditional welfare state. For this reason, in place of “welfare
state” we increasingly speak now of a “welfare
society”.
III. SYSTEM OF
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND DECENTRALISATION IN CROATIA
(1) There are three ways in which the state distributes social
benefits to its citizens. The first mechanism of distribution
is social insurance, which is associated with employment and
the payment of contributions. Such a type of social expenditure
can be regarded as a reward for what has been invested. This
category includes most pensions, sickness and unemployment
benefits, and insurance for accidents at work. The largest
part of social expenditure belongs to this system of social
insurance. The second type of state distribution concerns
universal or contingent expenditures. They are targeted towards
a defined population, and are given without additional control
and regardless of employment status. As a rule, this is a
kind of compensation for a certain condition and its goal
is to prevent poverty or the worsening of a social position.
This category of social expenditure includes children’s
benefits, the universal old-age pension, assistance for the
handicapped, etc. The third type of social expenditure includes
public relief, which is given following a control of revenues,
resources or working capability. The aim of public relief
is to overcome socially disadvantaged conditions by providing
assistance in the satisfaction of basic needs.
(2) Post-socialist
countries took a big step forward from marginal forms of social
assistance towards a wider, elaborated system. On the one
hand, social assistance has been used to complete the existing
social insurance system and in this way, through minimum protection,
the holes in the social safety nets were repaired. On the
other hand, the spreading of social assistance was the consequence
of the effort to control welfare costs, which is achieved
by giving support to those who need it most. Sipos writes
about social assistance in these counties: “The reform
of social insurance will probably, in time, lower the distribution
within the system. In this way, social assistance will stand
out as special care for vulnerable groups. Financing and giving
welfare assistance from a social insurance programme will
significantly improve the transparency of both systems. Such
a change requires the appropriate formation of social assistance
funds and the development of an efficient alternative mechanism
of distribution” (Sipos, 1994: 156). In the Visegrad
countries, social assistance reforms have been carried out.
In the Czech Republic, a new law on social help has been in
force since 1995, with the intention of moveing the user from
a passive to an active status. In 1993, a law was adopted
in Hungary which delegated new competence to local bodies.
The aim is for the local authorities to find adequate answers
to the social problems of the population. Poland underwent
a process which tried to transform the old system of assistance
into a system which would concentrate on alleviating poverty.
In Slovakia, the category of the social minimum is used, which
consists of two components: a) the amount necessary to cover
basic needs and (b) the amount to cover the basic costs of
a household, depending on its size (Cichon, 1995).
Post-socialist countries are faced with a great lack of funds
for welfare purposes, and consequently also for social assistance.
Therefore, they are looking for a rational model for managing
responsibility and financing social assistance. It is well-known
that the local authority too readily distributes help with
inflows from central funds. It has no motive for reducing
costs but, on the contrary, tries to satisfy the requests
of local users and applies strong pressure on central funds
to increase transfer. The situation is different when assistance
from the central funds is distributed through the local branches
of the central administration. However, this increases administrative
costs, and the central administration is not able to distribute
help in a rational manner.
In order to eradicate uncontrollable local expenditure, two
methods are usually applied: matching grants and block grants.
In the first case, the local authority itself must invest
certain funds if it wants additional central financing. The
problem appears when the local authorities do not have any
funds themselves, but depend totally on the central funds.
The establishment at a central level of the extent of assistance
for local needs has the advantage of avoiding pressures to
increase expenditure. Every increase of social expenditure
above a determined amount is a burden on the local authority,
which is thus forced to control expenditure. In the second
case, the central authority must have access to information
on the social situation and needs, because only in this case
can it equally distribute funds to the local units. In post-socialist
countries with a poor quality of social statistics and insufficient
experience in managing social services, it is difficult to
distribute funds to the local units. Since a reduction of
social expenditure is currently promoted, the experts of the
World Bank have recommended the second approach. “Nevertheless,
according to Sipos: The option of determining the extent of
support is given priority, while particular attention should
be devoted to the use of data on which the distribution is
founded and on which quality control systems are established”
(Sipos, 1994: 252).
General poverty and the scarce funds for welfare programmes
in post-socialist countries mean that there is an increasing
dependence on humanitarian organisations, that is, the non-profit
sector. These organisations are those which collaborate most
with the local bodies. The results of a study in Hungary show
that the local authorities are not able to manage welfare
problems, but turn to the non-profit sector for help. For
this reason, two-thirds of civil foundations have been established
on the incitement of the local authority. Local authorities,
“… gained greater flexibility - mainly in financial
matters - through non-profit organisation operating in this
legal form, making possible various social and technical innovations"
(Straussman & Levai, 1996: 21). Most local bodies within
the social sector in Hungary want to broaden and strengthen
their connections with non-governmental organisations. In
other words, the decentralisation of social policy can have
positive effects if this mobilises civil entities and resources,
particularly non-governmental organisations as mediators between
the citizens and the state, to resolve social problems.
(3) The social
assistance (welfare) system in Croatia is highly centralised
and mainly depends on the central state budget. Apart from
those from the state budget, more substantial funds for social
welfare, are allocated in Zagreb, and to a lesser extent in
Rijeka. Social Welfare Centres, as well as other social welfare
institutions, are directly responsible to the Ministry of
Labour and Social Welfare. The distribution of competence
is very unequal and does not follow the recommendation in
the quoted document of the Council of Europe. Such a centralised
system, which appeared as a consequence of war, reflects the
widespread syndrome of dependence on the sate and the expectation
that the state will resolve all social problems. This syndrome
is also marked by dissatisfaction with the unjust distribution
of wealth that took place in the previous period. It should
also be borne in mind that some areas were damaged in the
war to such an extent that the population of these areas practically
depends on state subsidies and social assistance, while the
local units have no possibility for any self-financing.
Consequently, the project of decentralisation must take into
account the very unequal economic conditions of the Croatian
regions and local communities. This fact alone, however, does
not mean that decentralisation has to be postponed, at least
with regard to social assistance. The Law on Social Welfare
has opened up some possibility of activating other resources,
such as reducing statism and rationalisation. However, the
realised results are not significant. Besides good regulations,
stimuli and an atmosphere suitable for local and other initiatives
are also important for success. In this respect, it would
be useful to quote the Hungarian experience in local initiatives:
“Successful innovations do not necessarily begin with
a fully elaborated plan. Our experience shows that it is much
more frequently the case that a charismatic individual speeds
up events until they lead to what could be called a creative
explosion" (Straussman & Levai, 1996: 8).
In our country, the tradition of humanitarian work is not
so well developed. One exception is the Church, which has
extensive experience and which, for a long time, has been
the key institution of civil society. People lean most on
the primary links of solidarity within their nuclear or wider
groups. However, the trends of the development in Croatian
society show the need for developing a non-governmental humanitarian
sector in normal, peacetime periods. Humanitarian organisations
sprang up in large numbers in exceptional war circumstances
when solidarity and cohesion were felt more strongly in society.
They showed their strength then, but also revealed some operational
disadvantages. Now is the chance for the peacetime, non-governmental
sector to develop, in parallel to the growth of national well-being
and the accession of Croatia to international associations.
In this context, the role of the state should be viewed from
a different perspective: “… If the state were
give real content to the practice of social justice and social
solidarity, the protection of certain basic social values
and so would really become an instrument of public good; and
if the non-profit sector playing its role of intermediary
and attention-drawer, were help shape a better relationship
between the citizens and the government. This could lead to
a new model of government in which it would not only be a
matter of ensuring public services but a combined efforts
by the different sectors - state, the non-profit, private,
in the interest of satisfying the community needs on a higher
level” (Straussman & Levai, 1996: 35).
According to all this, decentralisation can be an important
step towards the great reform of the Croatian welfare state,
but only if it is understood as part of a complex effort of
setting suppressed energies into motion to resolve social
and other problems.
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