

# Hunting for Huntington's Evidence: An Empirical Reassessment of The Clash of Civilizations Theory

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John Daniel Shindelar

Department of Political Science

Bemidji State University

**I inquire into Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations theory as outlined in his landmark *The Clash of Civilizations*. I explore conflicts starting at the end of the Cold War to 2007 in order to examine whether Huntington's theory has been materializing (there is a marked increase in conflicts between Civilizations and they have become more intense) or if the face of conflicts has stayed relatively similar to Cold War era clashes.**

**I use International Crisis Behavior data on conflicts since the fall of the U.S.S.R. which Huntington cites as the end of a bipolar world and the beginning of a new era of conflicts. I show that there is not a marked increase in the clash of civilizations that Huntington predicted.**

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## INTRODUCTION

Whether you are analyzing the present world or looking into the history of the world's civilizations, conflict has always been a major player in world change. Conflict Theory is an important aspect of foreign policy and international relations. Opinions towards the matter cover a broad range of beliefs, and much controversy surrounds this topic.

Conflict has often been the catalyst for inventing and implementing new technologies, a push for better efficiency, better resource management, uniting

people in groups against a common enemy, and prompting new medical discoveries as doctors strive to find the best way to treat injured and wounded soldiers. However conflict often devastates families, neighborhoods, nations and economies through direct harm, refugees, disease, rape, and the strain required to "maintain the fight" or carry out war.

Determining why a certain crisis arises can be challenging due to the major accumulation of grievances a conflict can involve. This is further complicated when considering that conflict may be in

the process of changing or may have already changed.

As stated by President Ronald Reagan, "Peace is not absence of conflict; it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means." It is therefore our responsibility as citizens to explore the possibilities and determine what can be done to prevent conflict and crisis from arising as best we can. It is recognizable that not all crises can be averted; however, it is our duty in those situations to work on understanding how best to reconcile and attain peace.

Conflict Theory is a highly debated topic and much research is done to understand it and how it has developed. Several scholars have done quantitative research of the clash of civilizations theory. However, their research is limited in the scope of data they used while others used incorrect approaches on how to operationalize and test the theory.

I explore whether or not there is empirical evidence for Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory. Previous studies used the Correlate of War (COW), Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), State Failure, Minorities at Risk (MAR), and Kosimo datasets. I use a new dataset, the International Crisis Behavior project dataset, for my analysis. This dataset has not formerly been used in assessing Huntington's theory. This dataset covers more years in the post-Cold-War era than previous studies, almost doubling the longest study by Chiozza (2002) by adding 10 years.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### The Theory of Clash of Civilizations

#### *The Next Pattern of Conflict*

Many intellectuals over the past two decades have speculated how the end of the Cold War has changed global politics. Many have pondered at what new systems are coming to light. There is much controversy over how to explain how the world functions in a global political sense at its most basic functions. Many scholars are questioning the importance of nation states and their influence.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's Samuel Huntington started looking for new ways for explaining the reasons for conflict. He called his concept "the clash of civilizations". Huntington theorized that the main source of conflict in the new world order would not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Instead Huntington puts forth the idea that the dominating source of conflict will be

cultural. He concedes that nation states will still remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but that conflicts concerning global politics will primarily be due to civilizational difference. Huntington theorized that nation-states were fading in influence and argued that nation-states are no longer reflective of actual borders. Huntington divides the world into eight civilizational groupings: "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly Africa". (*The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington, 1993) Huntington includes Africa because although there is a lack of solidarity among the African nations they do have common cultural ties. The possible African civilization does not have a core state to lead them and bind them together, and there is a more diverse culture base. These civilizations may seem like just another sociological way in which to categorize people but Huntington says, "Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real." (Huntington, 1993, p. 24)

#### *Civilizations*

Conflict has in the past several centuries taken place between multiple nation-state entities which Huntington tries to explain with civilizations. Civilizational commonality is a way of grouping together nations with common cultural identities; this includes ethnicity, religion, history, and values, and economics. Huntington argues that basic cultural backgrounds bind people together beyond what any nation-state can hope to achieve.

Huntington points out that you cannot change your ethnicity. And although you can be born half-French and half-Arab and be a citizen of two countries, you cannot be half-Catholic and half-Muslim. Religion is another key discriminator because there is no middle ground. A people's history, although you may change the way you look at it or write it, is also a binding factor among peoples. Your values mostly stem from religion, history, or ethnicity or from any combination of the three. Huntington also pointed out that economic regionalism is increasingly leading to more consciousness of civilizational identity.

People naturally think like minded within their civilization and have much more in common than they would with people from another civilization. People having a common cultural background, way of thinking, and a similar worldview will have stronger loyalty to one another than people just brought together in a nation-state by lines drawn on a

map. “These differences are products of centuries. They will not soon disappear”. (Huntington, 1993, p. 25)

Huntington’s breaks the world down into eight different civilizations according to these parameters. The Confucian civilization is the common culture of

China and Chinese groups that have migrated and spread throughout Southeast Asia. This includes areas such as Vietnam, North and South Korea as well as Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Hainan, and the Manila region of the Philippines.




Figure 1. Map distinguishing the different civilizations across the world within Huntington’s clash of civilizations.

The Japanese civilization is unique in that Huntington says it only encompasses Japan and its islands. Huntington cites that Japanese culture is distinctively different from the rest of Asia. This along with Japan’s lack of a large diaspora or a movement of religious evangelism to other countries leads Japan to be considered its own civilization.

The Hindu civilization is identified as the core Indian civilization and is centralized on Hinduism and the culture surrounding that religion. This civilization mainly encompasses India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. There is also a mix of Hindu civilization according to Huntington in Guyana and French Guiana. This is due to European colonization efforts with bringing in slaves from parts of the world including India.

The Islamic civilization is wide reaching and follows the spread of the Islamic religion. This civilization stretches across the world from the Iberian Peninsula and Western Africa, spreading

across North Africa and its eastern coast, the Arabian Peninsula into Central Asia, into India and down to South East Asia. This civilization includes many ethnicities among the many distinct subdivisions within Islam such as Arab, Turkic, Persian and Malay. Although India is largely Hindu, because of its religious diversity including large Islamic populations, the Islamic civilization mixes with the Hindu civilization.

The Orthodox civilization is mainly made up of countries with either Slavic ethnicity and/or Orthodox religion. It is centered in Russia and includes Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece. This civilization is separate from Western Christendom due to its large differences in ethnicity, history, and religion.

The Western civilization is centered in Europe and North America. This civilization is made up of

countries that share in Western Christianity and have a common history and link to Europe. This includes the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Germanic speaking countries, the Baltic States, the Nordic countries, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, some Pacific Islands, and the middle islands of the Philippines. The Philippines are included because of the western influence brought by Spain and America when they colonized. Israel is also included by Huntington saying it is an island of the West. Huntington also includes French Guiana as having Western civilizational ties from colonization.

The Latin American civilization is made up of Central and South American countries with a past of a corporatist, authoritarian culture. The majority of countries are of a Catholic majority. This civilization includes all of Central America, most of the Caribbean, and Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. Huntington leaves out Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana because of their mixed cultural influences brought in through colonization.

While the continent of Africa lacks a sense of a pan-African identity, Huntington claims that Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African Identity making a possible African civilization. This includes Madagascar, all of Southern Africa up to the Saharan desert, Ethiopia, and the bottom halves of Chad, Nigeria, Togo, and Benin. This civilization excludes the eastern coasts of Tanzania, Kenya, and all of Somalia due to Islamic influence.

#### *Fault Lines*

There are several other aspects that are essential to know in order to understand the clash of civilizations theory. Huntington's concept theorizes that most wars will now occur within nation-states and/or between the civilizations. Huntington argues that with the fall of the Iron Curtain and end of the Cold war we have new divisions that define groups. We will begin to see a shift in conflict taking place along the "fault lines of Civilizations." (Huntington, 1993, p. 22) These fault lines run directly through some nation-states and run in between civilizations.

One of the most noticeable fault lines exists across the middle of the African continent and along its' eastern coast between the African and Islamic civilizations. This is due to the North and Eastern coast having a largely Islamic population and Arab ethnicity while the Southern half of Africa's faith is mostly Christian with tribal ethnicities.

Another prominent fault line stretches down through Eastern Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. This is between the Orthodox and Western civilizations. Huntington explains the rift as occurring due to peoples west of this line experiencing the common European history including feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution. This line also represents the farthest eastern boundary of Western Christianity circa 1500. In the Balkans we see another mix of civilizations. This can be explained historically through the boundaries between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.

The northern border of the Islamic civilization is also a fault line. This runs across the Caucasus above Azerbaijan, and goes through central Asia above Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries used to be held together in the U.S.S.R. as Soviet Republics but have largely Muslim populations. To the north of this fault line are Georgia, Russia, and Kazakhstan which are mainly Orthodox populations. Conflicts in this region are usually between Ossetians and Ingush, Armenians and Azeris, and Russians and Muslims.

Another fault line is the Pakistani/India border. The differences come from the development of different religions. In the past, Muslim invaders came into India introducing Islam and today there are large Muslim populations within India, however this is a minority. Hinduism developed in India and is still central to their way of life. Although India is Hindu and Hinduism believes in the tolerance of all religions, Islam is monotheistic and has a low tolerance for other religions. Pakistan has a Muslim majority population and the two civilizations are in continual tension.

The Buddhist civilization has many fault lines along its borders. Buddhism started in India and spread up into China and down into South East Asia. Although it was suppressed and faded away in India and much of China, it remained strong in Tibet, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar.

The former Yugoslavia has the Orthodox, Western, and Islamic civilizations within its former boundaries which Huntington asserts could explain why so much conflict has flared up in that region. Other areas such as the Philippines, Papua New Guinea/Indonesia, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana all have fault lines cutting through their countries.

#### *Core States*

Another important component of Huntington's theory is core states. Huntington describes core states as the central leader of the civilization and the nations considered being the most prominent members of that civilization. According to Huntington's theory there are five civilizations that have core states. The Orthodox, Confucian, Japanese, Indian, and Western civilizations all have core states.

The Orthodox civilization has Russia as its core state. Russia is by far the most advanced nation of the Orthodox civilization. Its economy is strong; it has a lot of diplomatic clout internationally being a prominent member of the U.N. and sitting on the U.N. Security Council, it has one of the largest militaries in the world, is a nuclear power, and vast resources.

The Confucian civilization has China as its core state. China is the most prominent nation on mainland South East Asia and among the Confucian countries and has the biggest population in the world. China like Russia has a lot of diplomatic power and is on the U.N. Security Council, vast resources, is a nuclear power, and was a large military.

The Japanese civilization has Japan as its core state. This is obvious because Japan is the only member of the Japanese civilization according to Huntington. Japan is also a big international player, technologically advanced, has a large economy, large population and advanced military.

The Hindu civilization has India as its core state. The Hindu religion is centered on India and developed there and it is natural that it be the core state. India is also a major international power, the largest democracy, large military, is a nuclear power, and a large population competing with China.

While there are only five civilizations with core states there are actually eight core states. The Western civilization is the only one in which Huntington suggests there are multiple core states. The U.S. naturally is a core state due to being the super power militarily, economically, and technologically, and diplomatically. Huntington also includes Britain, France, and Germany as core states. This is because they are the central elements holding together and leading Europe. They all are nuclear powers, have large militaries, advanced technology, developed economies, and very strong diplomacy.

Huntington stated that although Africa doesn't have a core state, South Africa could easily rise to that position by taking on more leadership among the

African nations and restoring its previous nuclear power.

## TESTS OF "THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" THESIS

Some, such as Kenichi Ohmae in his book *The End of The Nation State* (1995, p. VIII), say "nation states are falling away to regional economic groupings. "The forces now at work have raised troubling questions about the relevance-and effectiveness-of nation states as meaningful aggregates in terms of which to think about, much less manage, economic activity. Ohmae presents examples of economic zones that function cross culturally and across borders while prospering greatly such as Hong Kong, the Catalonia region of Spain, and the Kansai region around Osaka in Japan. This research as well as Huntington's research questions the role of the modern nation state.

Huntington's clash of civilizations theory, however, is surrounded by much controversy and debate. Scholars debate the validity of this concept and the extent to which explains contemporary world affairs.

Fox (2002) published a study on the relationship between ethnic conflicts and civilizational conflicts. Fox used the Minorities at Risk dataset with conflicts from the years 1985 to 1998. Fox's study focuses on the post-Cold-War period for which he uses the year 1989 as the starting point. This covers nine years of post-Cold War era and is a good start at empirically testing Huntington's theory. He found no support for Huntington's theory. Instead he found that civilizational conflicts were only a small portion of ethnic conflicts and that ethnic conflict was more likely to occur within the same civilizations.

However this study's post-Cold-War focus of 9 years came directly after the end of the Cold War and Huntington said there would be a transition into Civilizational Clashes. Therefore these 9 years may be too short of a time period to measure the theory empirically. The study also only focuses on fighting between ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities and therefore limits the scope of conflicts.

Fox (2003) published another empirical study one year later dealing with the clash of civilizations. This time he used the State Failure dataset and focused on state failures that were intense and internal conflicts. Fox used data from the period covering 1950 to 1996. His study found that there were far fewer civilizational clashes after the end of the Cold-War. He also found that civilizational state

failures were not more intense than non-civilizational state failures.

Another prediction within Huntington's theory is that western civilization will face its new challenge from the Islamic or Confucian civilizations. Although there is no support for the Confucian side of the argument, Fox found that a majority of the West's civilizational conflicts were with the Islamic civilization. This supports Huntington but Fox argues that these civilizational clashes look more apparent now because of the end of the Cold-War and the loss of that threat.

However Fox's study limits itself in two major ways. Huntington never theorized that the clashes would occur in state failures and this study only examines the theory in terms of state failures limiting the empirical data. This study also has the majority of cases from the Cold-War period which Huntington was not trying to theorize about. Only seven years are used in this study from the post-Cold-War era thus limiting the scope of the testing.

E. A. Henderson and R. Tucker in 2001 published an empirical study on the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war between 1816 and 1992. They argued that although Huntington's theory has simplicity and explains some important current events it lacks evidence. They used the Correlates of War dataset and claim that their findings challenged Huntington's theory.

Their research compells them to believe that when civilization membership is part of the cause of war it has an inverse relationship to what Huntington's thesis predicted. They argued that countries within the same civilization were more likely to have conflict than countries of different civilizations. Their research also showed that civilization membership wasn't significant to the probability of interstate war.

However they did not rule out cultural differences as an issue influencing conflicts. They did also admit in their study that their data only tests the theory for a three year period of 1989 and 1992. This is an empirical limitation in their study and leaves the possibility that their work is incomplete.

In 2000 Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and Michaelene Cox used the Correlates of War data and examined militarized disputes between states during the 1950- 1992 period. They found that cross civilization conflicts became less common as the Cold War ended which is contrary to what Huntington predicted.

They also found that a civilization with a dominant or core state didn't affect the severity of violence within the civilization. They also cite that civilizations help determine alliances and may play a part in international relations. However they found that realist influences, alliances, relative power, joint democracy, and interdependence better explained the likelihood of interstate conflict than did Huntington's theory.

They focused for the main part on Cold-War era incidents. Only three years of post Cold-War era are included in their study. This is the same limitation experienced by Henderson and Tucker's research. This study can be considered inconclusive because of the insufficient empirical data.

Chiozza (2002) used the Kosimo dataset for researching whether or not states from different civilizations were more prone to conflict or not. He used data from 1946 to 1997. This study adds another 5 years to the previous studies' post Cold-War era range.

Chiozza's research found that intercivilizational conflicts were not more prone to turn into international conflict. Also he found, like Henderson and Tucker, that states within the same civilization were more prone to conflict than states in different civilizations. [Their research found that civilizations only helped to explain borders and regime types].

As with the other studies this one focused on data from the Cold-War period to which Huntington's theory does not apply. Although adding five more years than previous studies, Chiozza still only covered eight years of post-Cold-War period. This was a broader coverage, however it was still an empirical limitation and associations may still be unrecognizable due to insufficient data.

I bring a new empirical test by using a new data set, focus only on Post-Cold-War years, extend the period of data compared to previous studies, and focus on international crises. I will be using the International Crisis Behavior dataset which has not yet been used as the main data test for empirically testing the clash of civilizations theory. This dataset has data from international crises and the actors involved in those crises. I use data starting in 1989 which is the year Huntington cites as the end of the Cold-War. By doing this all the cases in the study are within the post-Cold-War era.

I use data from 1989 to 2007 which is the last year that the most recent ICB dataset has available. This will extend the longest previous study by 9 more

years and provide 18 years in total for the empirical study. This should be enough to cover the transition period that Huntington says will occur after the end of the Cold-War.

Also by studying international crises this study has more ability to test the intensity and severity of civilizational conflicts versus non-civilizational because it encompasses international conflicts ranging from full-scale wars, serious clashes, minor clashes and even crises with no violence involved.

## **METHODS AND ANALYSIS**

### **Dataset**

For this research study I used the ICB Datasets otherwise referred to as ICB. I use the 10<sup>th</sup> version of the datasets which were released in July of 2010. They are available through the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management or CIDCM site. These datasets were developed by the combined work of Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Michael Brecher, Joseph Hewitt, Kyle Beardsley, and Pelin Eralp. The datasets contain information on all international and foreign policy crises including 455 international crises and 1000 crisis actors covering a period of 1918-2007. I only use crises information from the years 1989-2007 since it is post-Soviet Union which complies with Huntington's theory.

### **Crises Definition**

The ICB dataset defines an International Crisis with two conditions: "(1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system – global, dominant, or subsystem. An international crisis begins when an event triggers a foreign policy crisis for one or more states. A foreign policy crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in the state's internal and external environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest level decision makers of the state actor concerned: a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. (Brecher, 1997, p. 4 and 5)

### **Independent and Dependent Variables**

#### *Independent Variables*

In Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations Theory, he first theorizes that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash, referred to as the civilizational clash claim. Second, he theorizes that fault line conflicts will become more common and be the most intense type of conflict since the actors are not as easy to separate due to their geographical proximity; this is referred to as the fault-line claim. And finally, Huntington says that core states involved in a crisis will likely rally member nations of its own civilization (kin nations) to its side in a crisis and create more clashes between civilizations. This is referred to as the core state claim.

To operationalize the civilizational clash claim and core state claim I use civclash as the independent variable. I created the civclash variable by looking at the actors involved in the crisis by using the ICB's crisis actor dataset and determining according to Huntington whether or not they were a civilizational clash. The civclash variable, measures if a crisis is a civilizational clash or not. A value of 1 is given if the crisis is a civilizational clash meaning that it involves nations from a minimum of two separate civilizations. A value of 0 is given if the crisis is not a civilizational clash and the nations involved are only within the same civilization.

To operationalize the fault line claim I use the fault line variable. I created this variable by looking at the actors involved in the crisis and determining whether or not according to Huntington if they were fighting across a faultline. For this variable I assigned a value of 1 to crisis that involved actors located on a civilizational fault-line that were fighting against each other. A value of 0 was given to crisis that involved actors that were not located on opposite sides of a fault-line, they may however still be civilizational clashes while not being fault-line clashes.

The corestate variable I created of violence measure by looking at the actors involved in the crisis by using ICB's crisis actor dataset and determined according to Huntington's classification whether or not they were a core state. A value of 1 is given to the crisis if 1 or more core states were involved in the crisis. A value of 0 is given to the crises if no core states were involved in the crisis.

#### *Dependent Variables*

The sevviosity variable measures the intensity of violence at four levels of increasing intensity. This

starts with the lowest intensity at a value of 1 where the conflict management technique did not involve violence. Then a value of 2 is used for Minor Clashes which categorizes crisis in which minor clashes or skirmishing occurred between actors, such as the South Ossetia-Abkhazia crisis of 2004. A value of 3 is used for Serious Clashes which categorizes crisis in which serious clashes or fighting just short of full scale war occurred, such as the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. A value of 4 is given for Full Scale Wars which categorizes crisis in which a Full Scale War occurred such as the Israel-Lebanon War 2 of 2006. This variable was added to *cenviosy* because their measurements together would measure the increasing totality of violence as their combined value progressed since they represent the intensity and violence of a crisis.

*WarIndex3* was created to measure a crisis' totality of violence. This variable was constructed by combining the variables *cenviosy* and *sevviosy* multiplied by the variable *protract* and then added to the variable *brexit* binned.

The *brexit* variable was in the ICB dataset already and is a measurement of the duration of the international crisis in days. This is an interval measurement which I binned by making two cut points at the 55 and 180 days marks. By doing this I was able to group the cases into three separate equal groups. A crisis falling before the first cut point is given a value of 1, while a crisis in the middle group is given a value of 2, and finally those crises after the second cut point were given a value of 3. I binned them in order to make their influence on the Index a more accurate representation of their effect on the totality of violence. They were added to the results from *cenviosy* and *sevviosy* after they were multiplied by *protract* which is described below. This represented the totality of violence as the duration of conflict occurred.

The *cenviosy* variable measures the centrality of violence to the crisis if violence was used as a crisis management technique or CMT. This starts with the value of 1 for No Violence when violence was not a central part of the crisis. Then a value of 2 is used if

Minor Violence was central to the crisis. Then a value of 3 is used if Violence was as important as a CMT. Finally a value of 4 is assigned to crisis where Violence was preeminent as a CMT as in the case of a full-scale war. This variable is not to be confused with the intensity of violence measure which focuses on the degree to which the fighting during the crisis reaches.

The *protract* variable is from the ICB dataset and measures whether a crisis situation is a part of a larger group of crisis making up an extended duration of hostility which is interrupted but consistent enough to make a pattern. A value of 1 is given to a crisis that is not a part of a protracted conflict. A value of 2 is given to a crisis that is part of a non-long-war protracted conflict. An example of this would be the conflicts involving Ethiopia and Somalia including the East Africa Confrontation (1980), the Todghere Incident (1987), and Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia (2006). Finally a value of 3 is assigned to crises that are part of a long-war protracted conflict. However no crises during the post-Cold-war period fell into the category of long-war protracted conflicts so that value was ignored. This variable was multiplied with the combinations from the addition of the *cenviosy* and *sevviosy* variables because when a crisis is part of a long history of crises between the same nations there is greater totality of violence due to unresolved grievances left over from the previous encounters.

In order to carry out my empirical assessment of Huntington's theory I ran cross-tabulations to evaluate the relationships.

Huntington theorizes that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash. To test this relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with *civclash* as my independent variable and *sevviosy* (intensity of violence) as my dependent variable. If Huntington's theory is correct the table should show a positive correlation with intensity of violence and the number of crises that were civilizational clashes. This should also be significant compared to non-civilizational crises and their intensity of violence.

Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Conflict as Incident of Civilizational Clash or not and the intensity of Violence.

Intensity of Violence	Civilizational Clash	
	No	Yes
No Violence	34.6% (10)	31.7% (13)
Minor Clashes	34.5% (10)	26.8% (11)
Serious Clashes	27.6% (8)	24.4% (10)
Full Scale War	3.4% (1)	17.1% (7)
Total	100%	100%

<b>Chi-Square</b>	3.198	
<b>P-Value</b>	.362	
<b>Cramer's V</b>	.214	<b>Approx. Sig.:</b> .362
<b>N</b>	70	

Looking at Table 1, out of the four levels of intensity, the largest share of Civilizational Clashes did not result in violence as a crisis management technique. 31.7% or 13 of the crises were nonviolent. However the majority of civilizational clashes did involve some level of violence 68.3% (28 of 41) when including minor and serious clashes with full scale war. Although there was a majority of crises being violent civilizational clashes, we see that there are fewer crises in each category as the violence is more intense.

With a very low Chi-Square we get a hint at poor association. The P-Value further adds to this with a high value of .362 which is well over our .05 mark for significance. With a Cramer's V of .214 we have a weak association. For the most part civilization clashes and non-civilizational clashes follow the same pattern of having a steady digression in the number of crises as the intensity increases. The only difference we see in the pattern is in the most intense

violence or Full-Scale War category. In this non-civilizational clashes only had 3.4% (one) of their crises while civilizational clashes had 17.1% (seven) of their crises as Full-Scale Wars. This on its own is a very large difference and would support Huntington's theory aside from the other categories. However, this difference compared to the overall test does not present a significant association and without that this test does not support Huntington's Theory.

Huntington also theorizes that core states involved in a crisis will likely rally member nations of its own civilization (kin nations) to its side in a crisis and create more clashes between civilizations. To test this relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with corestate as my independent variable and civclash as my dependent variable. If Huntington's theory is correct the table should show a positive correlation with core state involvement and the number of crises that were civilizational clashes. This should also be significant compared to non-civilizational crises and their core state involvement. Table 2 presents these results.

Table 2. Cross-tabulation of Core State Involvement and Civilizational Clash Conflict.

Core State Involvement	Civilizational Clash	
	No	Yes
No	82.8% (24)	48.8% (20)
Yes	17.2% (5)	51.2% (21)
Total	100%	100%

<b>Chi-Square</b>	8.399	
<b>P-Value</b>	.004	
<b>Phi</b>	.346	<b>Approx. Sig.:</b> .004
<b>N</b>	70	

Comparing the two columns, we see a sizable difference in core state crises that are or are not civilizational clashes. Only five of the crises that had a core state involved were not civilizational clashes compared to 21 that were civilizational clashes. This difference is significant enough to point to Huntington's theory that core state involvement is more likely when a crisis is a civilizational clash. We also see that out of the crises that had no core state involved, there were more non-civilizational clashes than civilizational clashes.

Looking further at the test we see the Chi-Square value of 8.399 yields significance at .005. With a Phi value of .346 we have a moderate association. With these results we can safely argue

that civilizational clashes do indeed have an effect on crisis involving a core state and this test supports Huntington's theory on Core States.

Huntington also theorizes that Fault-Line Conflicts will become more common and be the most intense type of conflict since the actors are not as easy to separate due to their geographical proximity. To test this relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with faultline as my independent variable and severity as my dependent variable. If Huntington's theory is correct the table should show a positive association between intensity of violence and fault line conflicts that were fault line clashes. This should also be significant compared to non-fault line crises and their intensity of violence. Table 3 presents this analysis.

Table 3. Cross-tabulation of Fault Line Conflicts and Intensity of Violence.

Intensity of Violence	Fault-Line Conflicts	
	No	Yes
No Violence	37.5% (18)	22.7% (5)
Minor Clashes	29.2% (14)	31.8% (7)
Serious Clashes	27.1% (13)	22.7% (5)
Full Scale War	6.2% (3)	22.7% (5)
Total	100%	100%

<b>Chi-Square</b>	4.732	
<b>P-Value</b>	.192	
<b>Cramer's V</b>	.260	<b>Approx. Sig.:</b> .192
<b>N</b>	70	

Although we see little difference in fault-line crises' level of intensity of violence, we see quite a difference in the non-fault-line crises levels of intensity. 37.5% of the non-fault-line crises involve no violence as opposed to 6.2% at the level of full scale war. These results point towards Huntington's theory that fault-line conflicts will be more intense in violence.

When we look at the data further we see that the Cramer's V value of .260 tells us there is a weak association. The P-Value with a high value of .192 telling us that there is little significance. Although there is no significance and a weak association between Intensity of Violence and Fault-Line conflicts, we can still argue that this test does point towards supporting Huntington's theory.

#### *U.S. Involvement*

As an alternative to Huntington, I theorize that the United States involvement might be discounting the statistical results because of its disproportionate role of power in global affairs. To operationalize this I used the variable USINV.

The variable USINV is a measurement of the Content of U.S. Activity in the crisis. A value of 1 is given to the crisis if the U.S. was not active. A value of 2 is given if the crisis contained Low-Level U.S. activity, this could be political activity, financial aid or withholding of aid, economic involvement, propaganda involvement. A value of 3 is given if the U.S. was covertly active or semi-militarily active, this includes support for anti-government forces, military aid, and sending advisors, and all other means short of actual participation in the fighting. A value of 4 is given if the U.S. was a direct military participant in the crisis with either troops dispatched, bombings of targets, or naval assistance to an actor in the crisis.

To test the relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with USINV as my dependent variable and civclash as my independent variable. If my hypothesis is

correct then U.S. involvement will be significantly higher in civilizational clashes than in non-civilizational clashes.

Table 4. Cross-tabulation of U.S. Involvement and Civilizational Clash.

Content of U.S. Involvement	Civilizational Clash	
	No	Yes
No Involvement	41.4% (12)	0.0% (0)
Low Involvement	41.4% (12)	56.1 (23)
Semi Military-Covert	13.8% (4)	19.5% (8)
Direct Military Involvement	3.4% (1)	24.4% (10)
Total	100%	100%

<b>Chi-Square</b>	22.766	
<b>P-Value</b>	.000	
<b>Cramer's V</b>	.570	<b>Approx. Sig.: .000</b>
<b>N</b>	70	

At first glance it becomes apparent that there are large differences between the categories. There are many (41.4%) non-civilizational clashes that have no U.S. involvement while there are no civilizational clashes without any U.S. involvement. Looking at direct military involvement by the U.S. we see 3.4% (1) are not civilizational clashes while 24.4% (10) are civilizational clashes. This first evaluation points toward supporting the U.S. involvement theory.

When we look further we see the Chi-Square value is quite high at a value of 22.766 yielding significance at .000. According to the Crammer's V value of .57 we know that there is an association. We then know that the U.S. involvement does have a strong effect on the Civilizational Clash variable with a moderate association and significance and that this may give cause to why there is this many civilizational clashes.

### CONCLUSION

Huntington's theory is that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash does not have significant association and although my analysis does not completely support Huntington's Theory, it does point in that direction when looking at the full-scale war level of intensity of violence. Huntington's theory that Core States involved in a crisis will be prone to create more clashes between civilizations is supported by my analysis.

Huntington's theory that Fault-Line Conflicts will become more common and be the most intense

type of conflict is shown to have no significance and a weak association. Although this test doesn't have significance, the trends of the test do point toward supporting Huntington's theory.

My analysis also supported Jonathan Fox's previous finding that countries within the same civilization are more likely to have an ethnic crisis. My theory that the United States involvement might an outlier in comparison to other nations in foreign intervention had a moderate association and high significance which we can conclude may give cause to why there are this many civilizational clashes.

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Crises Used in Study			
Crisis Name	Civilization Clash	Core State Involvement	Fault Line
LIBYAN JETS	Yes	Yes	No
MAURITANIA/SENEGAL	No	No	No
CAMBODIA PEACE CONFERENCE	Yes	No	No
CONTRAS 4	No	No	No
GALTAT ZEMMOUR 2	No	No	No
INVASION OF PANAMA	Yes	Yes	No
KASHMIR 3- NUCLEAR	Yes	Yes	Yes
GULF WAR	Yes	Yes	Yes
RWANDA/UGANDA	No	No	No
LIBERIA/SIERRA LE	Yes	No	No
GHANA/TOGO BORDER 2	No	No	No
YUGOSLAVIA 1: CROATIA/SLOVENIA	Yes	No	Yes
BUBIYAN	Yes	No	No
FOREIGN INTERVENTION: ZAIRE	Yes	Yes	No
ECUADOR/PERU BORDER 4	No	No	No
NAGORNO-KARABAKH	Yes	No	Yes
EGYPT/SUDAN BORDER. II	No	No	No
YUGOSLAVIA 2: BOSNIA	Yes	No	Yes
PAPUA NEW GUINEA/SOLOMON ISLANDS	No	No	No
SLEEPINGDOG HILL	No	No	No

IRAQ NO-FLYZONE	Yes	No	No
GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA	No	No	No
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR 1	Yes	Yes	No
OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY	No	No	No
CAMEROON/NIGERIA 3	No	No	No
HAITI MILITARY REGIME	No	Yes	No
IRAQ DEPLOYMENT/KUWAIT	No	Yes	No
ECUADOR/PERU 5	No	No	No
SPRATLY ISLANDS	No	No	No
TAIWAN STRAIT 4	No	Yes	No
REDSEA ISLANDS	No	No	No
AEGEAN SEA 4	Yes	No	Yes
OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH	Yes	No	Yes
DESERT STRIKE	Yes	Yes	No
NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE	No	No	No
ZAIRE CIVIL WAR	No	No	No
UNSCOM 1	Yes	Yes	No
CYPRUS/TURKEY MISSILE	Yes	No	Yes
ERITREA/ETHIOPIA 1	Yes	No	Yes
INDIA/PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS	Yes	Yes	Yes
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CIVIL WAR	No	No	No
US EMBASSY BOMBINGS	Yes	Yes	No
SYRIA/TURKEY	No	No	No
UNSCOM 2	Yes	Yes	No
KOSOVO	Yes	Yes	Yes
KARGIL	Yes	Yes	Yes
EAST TIMOR 2	Yes	No	No
CASPIAN SEA	Yes	No	Yes
AFGHANISTAN/USA	Yes	Yes	No
INDIA PARLIAMENT ATTACK	Yes	Yes	Yes
KALUCHAK	Yes	Yes	Yes
MYANMAR-THAILAND	No	No	No
PARSLEY ISLAND	Yes	No	No
PANKISI GORGE	No	Yes	No
IRAQ REGIME CHANGE	Yes	Yes	No
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR 2	Yes	Yes	No
IRAN NUCLEAR 1	Yes	Yes	No
HAIFA SUICIDE BOMBING	Yes	No	Yes
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO/RWANDA	No	No	No
SOUTH OSSETIA/ABKHAZIA	No	Yes	No
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA 2	Yes	No	Yes
CHAD-SUDAN 1	No	No	No
IRAN NUCLEAR 2	Yes	Yes	No
CHAD-SUDAN 2	No	No	No
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 3	Yes	Yes	No
ISRAEL LEBANON WAR 2	Yes	No	Yes
ETHIOPIA INTERVENTION SOMALIA	Yes	No	Yes
CHAD-SUDAN 3	No	No	No
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA 3	Yes	No	Yes
CHAD-SUDAN 4	No	No	No



